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Abstract: Some literature on asexuality has claimed that it is inherently radical and 
contains the potential for resistance.  Unfortunately this literature has tended to be 
unempirical, has imagined asexuality as a disembodied entity and marginalised the 
multiple identities held by asexual people.  This paper, inspired by Plummer’s critical 
humanist approach, seeks to explore how individuals understand their asexuality to 
encourage forms of political action in the areas of: identity, activism, online spaces 
and LGBT politics. What we found was a plurality of experiences and attitudes with 
most adopting a pragmatic position in response to their social situation which saw 
large scale political action as irrelevant. We conclude by reflecting on what these 
results mean for those who see asexuality as potentially radical. 
Keywords: Asexuality, critical humanism, identity, LGBT, sexuality 
The emergence of asexuality has led scholars to make strong political claims.  These writers 
have suggested that asexuality has the potential to: redefine the nature of intimate 
relationships; overcome the dominance of ‘sexusociety’; resist neoliberal conceptions of 
citizenship; and aid anarchist politics.  Unfortunately, the strength of these claims has run 
inverse to the evidence used to substantiate them.  Instead they have largely concerned what 
asexuality ought to be and, ipso facto, how asexual people ought to behave rather than 
exploring the beliefs and actions of asexual people.  This has been part of a wider trend where 
‘asexuality’ comes to be treated as a disembodied entity which ‘challenges’ contemporary 
society.  Unfortunately, this overlooks how asexuality exists as a sexual orientation held by a 
diverse set of people, resulting in differing forms of action. 
2 
 
To counter this trend, this paper outlines the political views held by asexual people.  We will 
discuss: the salience of asexual identity; our participants’ activism; and their interaction with 
LGBTQ groups/politics1.  In doing so, we are in agreement with two arguments concerning 
the nature of sociological research.  Firstly, we share Plummer’s advocacy of a ‘critical 
humanist’ perspective which, with its use of ‘documents of life’ seeks to pay special attention 
to the ‘concrete human experiences’ of social life in which individuals ‘respond to social 
constraints and actively assemble social worlds’ (Plummer 2001:14).  This does not, as 
indicated, involve marginalising forms of oppression and injustice, but rather, in 
understanding how these are experienced and interpreted, abides by ‘the humanistic 
commitment of the qualitative researcher to study the world always from the perspective of 
the interacting individual’ (Lincoln and Denzin 1994:575).  It is this commitment which often 
has been lacking in the literature to date.  Secondly, we echo Duncan’s (2011) claim that 
when discussing processes of social change, in his case individualization, sociologists have 
tended to place individuals either into a ‘vanguard’ or ‘traditionalist’ camps.  Instead, as 
Duncan demonstrates, these groups may only cover a small minority, with the majority of 
actors adopting a more ‘pragmatic’ approach of partial acceptance and disagreement towards 
emerging social formations, based upon their value and significance to them.  Therefore, 
following these principles, we seek to understand how asexual people experience and 
interpret their own identities, any resulting oppression they experience, and how this does or 
does not inspire them to engage in political action. As we shall see, while some of our 
participants were active politically, others saw no need for asexual activism and were 
dismissive of the notion.  We will conclude by suggesting that rather than ascribing a political 
position to asexuality, we should be aware of the diversity of asexual people’s experiences.  
This emerges when we ‘listen attentively to the stories people tell of their lives’ (Plummer 
2001:255). 
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The Politics of Asexuality 
Asexuality can be defined as, to use the definition from the Asexuality, Visibility and 
Education Network (AVEN) as ‘a person who does not experience sexual attraction’ (AVEN 
2017). However, forms of asexual identity take more complex forms which operate across 
two axes. The first concerns sexual desire, running from a complete absence of/aversion to 
sexual desire (‘asexual’, ‘sex-repulsed’) through people who may feel sexual desire once a 
relationship has developed (‘demisexual’) and up to those in the ‘grey area’ between 
asexuality and forms of sexual desire (‘grey-a’).  This axis intersects with another concerning 
romantic attraction, which covers not only the amount of romantic attraction (‘aromantic’ or 
‘romantic’) but also the object of such attraction (‘homoromantic’, ‘biromantic’, 
‘heteroromantic’ etc.).  The complex forms of identities which can be produced across these 
intersections (such as, in our sample, heteromantic grey-asexual, panromantic demisexual and 
repulsed heteromantic asexual) are significant not only for understanding the complexity of 
asexual identity (see Dawson, Scott, McDonnell 2017a) but also, as we shall see below, for 
the differing approaches to asexual activism they produced. 
What can be termed the ‘political literature’ on asexuality seeks to place these complex 
asexual positions within a wider conception of ‘sexusociety’ (Pryzbolo 2011) as a response to 
the first studies on asexuality from the human sciences  (e.g. Bogaert 2004, Prause and 
Graham 2007, Brotto et al. 2010, Yule et al. 2014). This earlier body of literature attracted 
notable criticism, frequently on the grounds of methodology (Hinderliter 2009, Carrigan et al. 
2013).  However, the political literature offered a more fundamental critique. 
Pryzbolo (2012) argues that the knowledge of asexuality has been shaped by scientific 
definitions.  This began with Kinsey’s attempt to challenge what he saw as a problematically 
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high level of ‘X-ness’ (asexuality) among women and continues as an effort to identify the 
‘truth of the body’ (Pryzbolo 2012:234).  By suggesting asexuality can be identified and 
predicted solely by biological and physiological characteristics science acts as a form of 
‘sexual colonization which purports to identify and label whole sexual realities for groups of 
certain people’ (Pryzbolo 2012:230).  As a result, Pryzbolo cautions against seeing scientific 
research as libertatory.  Instead, it could limit the potential claims concerning asexuality by 
marginalising the ideas of those who identify with it (Pryzbolo 2012:239). 
Chasin (2013) develops this political critique by identifying an innate ‘academic 
conservatism’.  There are three key claims to her argument.  Firstly, the attempt to establish 
asexuality as a ‘legitimate’ sexual orientation has relied upon an image of the ‘real’ asexual 
who ‘has all the characteristics of the ideal sexual person but is simply unable to be sexual 
and, therefore, should be accepted as asexual’ (Chasin 2013:418).  This has been referred to 
elsewhere as the construction of the ‘gold star’ asexual who is likely to be an attractive, 
white, able bodied, middle class person (Cuthbert 2017).  Secondly, by defining the ‘real’ 
asexual this also imagines ‘people who are “legitimate” subjects of psychiatric intervention 
for low sexual desire’ (Chasin 2013:406).  Finally, this binary between ‘real’ asexuals and 
those who legitimately need treatment means the primacy of the sexual is maintained.  This, 
for Chasin, is the inevitable result of an academic approach that seeks to classify and 
categorise individuals, rather than change the social environment in which they live, 
consequently negating the radical potential of asexuality which rests in the idea that: 
If it can be okay for asexual people to not want sex, maybe we can make it okay for anyone to 
not want sex. This would be a world where being sexual is no longer mandated as a 
prerequisite of normalcy or intimacy and where nonsexual relationships are recognized and 
valued. It would be a world without sanctions against not wanting sex – where sex is no 
longer an obligation or a commodity that is owed. This would be a world where no level of 
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sexual desire is pathological and where the social emphasis is on sexuality being self-
affirming in whatever unique form it takes (Chasin 2013:416)  
It is this point, that asexuality is potentially radically transformative, which comes to define 
the political literature.  For example, Milks and Cerankowski (2014:13-14) argue asexuality 
has the potential to question a ‘mainstream culture, with its “make it sexy” imperative and 
“hot or not” hierarchy’ and to ‘radically rethink sexuality, queerness, desire, and intimacy in 
terms of not desiring sex, not having sex, or not experiencing sexual attraction’.  Similar 
radical claims for asexuality include: the problematizing of ‘sex’ as an essential act (Pryzbolo 
2011, Flore 2014); questioning a form of neoliberal ‘liberal humanism’ in which a productive 
(in all sense of the term) individual is valued (Gressgård 2013, Pryzobolo 2013); the 
‘desexualisation’ of identity in favour of notions of difference (Gupta 2017) and suggesting a 
‘healthy’ lifestyle which doesn’t require sex (Kim 2010).  A particularly confident version of 
this argument comes from Fahs (2010) who, in equating asexuality with a choice made by 
women, frames asexual people as ‘radical refusals’.  By refusing to engage in sex asexual 
people reclaim agency over their body and echo an anti-family politics found in radical 
feminist perspectives.  This is fundamentally anarchist; a form of positive freedom 
challenging those seeking to control female bodies.  Consequently, asexuality is either queer 
or pathological (Sinwell 2014, Kurowicka 2015), with the former challenging a 
‘conservative’ LGBT politics which proclaims same-sex marriage as a key goal (Scherrer 
2010, Chu 2014). 
While the political literature provided a useful critique of the human scientific approach to 
asexuality, it is open to two criticisms.  Firstly, whether asexuality is a potentially radical 
political formation is an empirical claim, which is not justified solely by rejecting a 
conservative human scientific approach.  However, with the exception of Scherrer (2010) and 
Gupta (2017, see below), none of this literature has used empirical data. This is important for 
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the second criticism: in making these arguments, asexuality is reified as a disembodied entity 
with its own agency:  
Asexuality, in choosing to repeat differently, must also choose to abandon its reactive, binary-
bound sense of itself, focusing on what it does instead of what it does not do. It must shift 
from declarations of absence, to an enacting of difference, both linguistically and actually. 
For resistance to be genuine, asexuality should repeat itself differently, plurally, and 
complexly. This is where its resistant energies lie: in alternative and plural enactments. This is 
what asexuality must do as a strategy of being, for absence can only be exciting and 
meaningful for short bursts of time (Pryzbolo 2011: 456-457) 
Here, ‘asexuality’ exists, but not asexual people.  Similar claims are found in Flore’s 
(2014:29) abstract assertion that we should consider asexuality a form of resistance since that 
would be ‘more interesting and politically viable’ and Fahs’ (2010:456) unsubstantiated 
claim that ‘social desirability and economics drive asexuals into relationships despite lack of 
sexual attraction or arousal’.  The problem here is that ‘asexuality’ doesn’t act politically; 
asexual people may or may not mobilise politically.  Whether this happens is an empirical 
question.  
This creation of a political entity named ‘asexuality’ means that, ironically given its 
emergence as a response to ascriptive claims from the human sciences, the political literature 
tends to proclaim there is a ‘correct’ political position: 
These kinds of politicizations present a prescriptive asexual politics with teleological 
investments, one that repeats mainstream prescriptions for asexual identities: ‘you’re just not 
fully mature yet’; ‘you’re a late bloomer’; ‘you just haven’t found the right person’.  
Paralleling this narrative of personal maturity, then, is a narrative of political maturity: as 
though, when asexual politics discovers how to be ‘genuinely transformative’, then it will be 
suitably liberated, transgressive – whole (Milks 2014:113) 
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This then leads to the second critique: these political claims tend to see asexuality as ‘a single 
axis of identity with little consideration of social relations of gender, “race”, class and 
disability’ (Cuthbert 2017:241-242).  Indeed, researchers have been critical of the tendency 
for such research to overlook how asexuality is racialized (Owens 2014) and marginalises 
those who are disabled and asexual (Kim 2011) as part of an actor’s plural identities.  For 
example, Cuthbert’s intersectional (2017) research on those who identify as both asexual and 
disabled indicated that, while some were politically active, others, contrary to the political 
literature, saw their asexuality as, at least partly, ‘caused’ by their disability. Some were 
concerned about attending events like Pride, for fear that asexuality would be seen as more 
transgressive than it is (Cuthbert 2017: 248-252).  
Gupta’s (2017) paper, by drawing upon interviews and thus being a rare empirical 
exploration of this topic, deserves extended discussion here.  Gupta (2017:1000-1009) 
suggests asexual people practice resistance by: emphasising a language of difference rather 
than deviance when it comes to asexuality; encouraging the ‘desexualisation’ of identity; 
seeking ‘new relationships’ on the boundary of friendship and romance; and building an 
asexual community. Gupta’s paper is a valuable discussion of how her participants 
experience marginalisation.  She also recognises that not all asexual practices are inherently 
radical, and is well attuned to the aforementioned critique of Milks.  However, there are two 
ways in which our paper diverges from hers.  Firstly, a limitation she acknowledges 
(2017:996) is that her participants were all active in AVEN.  This is significant, not only 
given that not all asexual people are active on AVEN, but also since, as we will discuss, 
many of our participants were critical of the political positions founded on AVEN.  Secondly, 
Gupta’s definition of ‘resistance’ is extremely broad.  For example, seeing asexuality as not a 
key part of one’s identity is, for Gupta, ‘radical in that it contests the idea that sexuality is a 
central part of what it means to be human’ (Gupta 2017:1013).  However, for something to 
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qualify as ‘resistance’ we surely need to demonstrate whether this attitude engenders forms of 
social action which seek to encourage forms of social change.  This is not fully demonstrated 
in Gupta’s analysis, which focuses largely on self-understanding; simply being asexual comes 
to be seen as resistance. But, in this example it is equally plausible, as was indeed the case for 
many of our participants, for this attitude to discourage political action precisely because 
one’s sexual identity is not seen as especially significant to their social experiences2.   
Therefore, we would suggest that when discussing radical politics and ‘resistance’, as the 
political literature seeks to, we need to be aware of two factors: firstly, how are political 
positions taken by individuals who then mobilise, or do not mobilise, around these political 
claims?  Secondly, given the diversity of asexuality – not just within the asexual umbrella but 
the diversity of social positions occupied by asexual people – we need to be attuned not just 
to what unites asexual people but what divides them.  In an attempt to respond to these 
criticisms, we will focus specifically on: the salience of identity; activism; online spaces; and 
the role of asexuality within LGBTQ spaces/politics.  Before this, we discuss the 
methodology of our project. 
Methodology 
The findings in this paper emerged from a two-year project entitled DETAILS REMOVED 
FOR PEER REVIEW. This set out to answer two questions: ‘How do individuals form an 
asexual identity?’ and ‘How is intimacy constructed and maintained in relationships where 
one, or all, of the principles identifies as asexual?’.  Participants were asked to take part in 
two activities: a biographical in-depth narrative interview discussing how their asexual 
identity has developed and a two week diary which contained daily prompts concerning their 
experiences of being asexual. 50 participants took part in the interview, of whom 27 also 
completed the diary. As the above indicates, asexual politics were not the focus of our 
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research. Nevertheless, given the prominence of the political literature we did include a 
question about whether our participants had ‘been an activist in the asexual community or in 
relation to asexual issues’. Furthermore, participants often volunteered information about 
these issues, along with their political engagements more generally, when discussing how 
they came to identify as asexual.  The majority of data discussed in this come from the 
interviews, not just because of their greater number but also because of how much people 
talked about political issues in those conversations.. We shall refer to all of the participants in 
this paper with pseudonyms.  
 
We analysed our data using thematic analysis and NVivo 10.  This involved coding the entire 
data set framed by our initial research question and then using the codes as building blocks 
for analytically interpretive themes. The themes discussed in this paper were part of a 
separate secondary analysis concerning emergent themes on politics.  In line with Plummer’s 
(2001) critical humanist approach the purpose of this analysis section was to understand how 
participants understood their social situations as knowledgable actors who ‘nest in a universe 
of context’ (Plummer 2001:262) while also having clear ‘moral characters’ which concern 
themselves with the question of ‘how to live a life’ (Plummer 2001:263).  Consequently, our 
purpose was to understand what is and isn’t seen as political action from our participants’ 
perspective.  We shall return to a possible critique of our approach, that actors may not be 
politically knowledge or be cognisant of appropriate political tactics, in the conclusion to our 
paper.  
We recruited by a variety of means, including a call for participants on AVEN along with 
other online spaces such as Tumblr, Twitter and a note attached to a Huffington Post article.  
Additionally, we sought to recruit via LGBT groups and flyers posted locally.  Despite efforts 
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to obtain a broad group of participants, our eventual sample did contain the same skew found 
in other qualitative research on asexuality.  Namely, based upon participant information self-
completion questionnaires, 76% of our sample were under 29 years old and only 10% above 
the age of 42, 66% were female/cisfemale, 16% male/cis male (with 6 further gender 
identities accounting for the remaining participants), 54% had a University qualification, 22% 
had completed A Levels or equivalent, 18% had completed GCSE or equivalent, 74% were 
white3 and 76% came from either the UK or the US (with the remainder spread across 
Sweden, Canada and Australia). The forms of asexual identification were, however, very 
diverse, with our 50 participants offering 22 different identities (4 people provided no 
response). ‘Aromatic Asexual’ accounted for 8 and ‘heteroromantic asexual’ 5 of our 
participants with the remaining 20 identities (which spanned across the romantic attraction 
and sexual desire axes) being held by between 1-4 participants.   
As we shall see, this diversity of identities is significant to any debate on asexual politics.  In 
our sample, the other demographic categories had less impact on our participants’ 
involvement in asexual politics.  It was the case that younger, more well-educated, 
participants were more likely to have taken part in LGBT groups due to their having joined 
them while at University.  Additionally,, the ‘newness’ of asexuality as an identity may have 
meant that participants aged around 30 and over had developed a separate identity prior to the 
emergence of political spaces (such as AVEN) devoted to asexuality.  Nevertheless, aside 
from these two qualifying comments, it was primarily the nature of asexual identification 
which, for reasons we shall explore, provided divergences, when these existed, in our data. 
We acknowledge, however, that this could be due to the relative homogeneity of our sample 
(though we would suggest this could reflect the position of those likely to identify as asexual, 
see Dawson, McDonnell, Scott 2017) and recognise the continued importance of the 
intersectional approach to asexuality advocated by Cuthbert (2017).  
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The Salience of Identity 
We begin with how central our participants considered asexuality to be to their lives. As we 
have discussed elsewhere (Scott, McDonnell, Dawson 2016; Dawson, Scott, McDonnell 
2017) this revealed a variety of perspectives ranging from rejection as a ‘non-issue’ (Nadine) 
through neutral indifference as number ten on a top ten list of one’s identities (Kris), to 
enthusiastic embracing as meaning ‘I’m no longer upset to be who I am’ (Tom). 
What is relevant for this paper are the explanations offered by participants as to the value, or 
lack thereof, attached to their asexuality.  In particular, to what extent did our participants see 
their asexuality as a key factor that marginalised them from areas of social life, or left them 
open to discrimination?  This returns to us to the problems of living in a ‘sexusociety’ 
(Przybolo 2011), which inspired the political literature.  We did, of course, find evidence of 
discrimination against asexual people.  A particularly stark instance came from Bella: 
I just remember just, like, situations where I was, yeah, getting asked the same basic questions 
‘So what is asexuality?’, and it’s like: ‘when you don’t experience sexual attraction’ and then 
it was like ‘Eughhhhh’. And then certainly a lot of the sort of guys there were rugby lads, or 
whatever, were just like ‘No you’re not!’.  And there was one, oh my God, there was one guy 
who was just sort of like ‘Oh, yes – you need a good cock in you’…No one challenged it 
Without wishing to downplay such instances,, what was marked in our sample was that this 
was not the majority experience.  Instead participants frequently spoke of how they had heard 
of instances of discrimination against other asexual people but they had been ‘lucky’ (as 
Winnie put it).   
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This was linked to the act of coming out, which should be central to asexual politics, since it 
would aid movements engaged in ‘radical refusal’ (Fahs 2010).  However, coming out was 
not considered important for many of our participants. For instance: 
Martha: I think asexuality is a sexuality in the sense that atheism is a religion…I just don’t 
think that asexuals face the same challenges as someone coming out as a homosexual…So it 
might be a ‘coming out’, but not nearly as risky. 
Interviewer: And why do you think it’s not?  
Martha: I think it’s just because it’s a lack…I mean, you do still encounter problems, of 
course you do with someone who might be interested in you, and having to tell them the truth 
and then have that whole situation. But I mean, as far as I know, no one’s been beat up or 
killed or stuck into an asexuality-to-straight camp. The asexual way I don’t think is quite the 
same. 
Two things are significant in Martha’s story, the first is her note that problems occur ‘with 
someone who might be interested in you’.  This reflected a wider claim that discussing 
asexuality was necessary as a precursor to a relationship, either to dismiss the possibility or to 
allow for negotiations.  As Josie put it, asexuality was a ‘little voucher in my bag’ which she 
could use to explain her lack of interest in dating.  Prior to this, participants dismissed the 
importance of coming out. This then picks up on Martha’s other point: since asexuality is a 
‘lack’ and, unlike homosexuality, was not seen to come with the same risks, it wasn’t 
significant to come out.  As Nate put it: 
I see asexuality as something that defines who you are, but because it’s something you don’t 
do…there’s millions of things I don’t do. I don’t go telling people those things either...I don’t 
go round telling people that I don’t like dusting 
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Similar thoughts were expressed by Immy, who was ‘reluctant to define myself with a 
negative and I feel that’s exactly what asexuality does’ and suggested that asexuality is a 
private, rather than public, matter.   
In terms of intersecting identities, our participants who were homo/bi/polyromantic were 
likely, given the greater cultural awareness of these orientations tied to sexualities, to identify 
as that first before coming to an asexual identity.  Examples of this came from Nasela, who 
was the only person out as gay at her school, and Faith, who had used multiple identities 
before identifying as queer in her late-teens.  For both of them, coming out as gay or queer 
led to much more discrimination than their asexual identity.  A possible reason for this was 
identified by Lizzie: 
I’m heterosexual or like hetero-romantic and so like, um and I realise that I am privileged in 
that sense that if I did start dating someone I would be dating someone of the opposite sex and 
so nobody would really know about, just immediately looking at us that sort of sexual 
orientation I guess is the word 
Being heteroromantic removed a visible attribute, which necessitated coming out; Lizzie 
could walk down the street hand-in-hand with her boyfriend and people would assume she 
was straight.  As Iris, currently in a relationship with a man, put it, she can ‘pass as straight’4.   
As we have seen in this section, the centrality of asexuality to our participants’ subjectivities 
can be questioned.  To quote Maisie: ‘”asexual” isn’t who I am. This is just what I am, not 
who I am as a person’.  This would seem to question claims that being asexual places one in a 
radical political position.  Furthermore, as Maisie’s quotation indicates, asexual can be seen 
as a description of the actions one does, or does not, take part in rather than an attribute of 
them as a person which creates marginalisation.  In short, the ‘desexualisation’ of identity 
(Gupta 2017) can be a form of accommodation to the world, rather than resistance to it.   
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Activism 
For the majority of our participants, asexuality had value in helping explain to themselves, 
and significant others, who they were. However, even those who had experienced forms of 
discrimination did not see much need to engage in forms of activism. What we see instead is 
a more complex relation to forms of political action, moving from complete dismissal, 
through awareness at an interpersonal level, to attempts at educating others.   
For the first group of participants who dismissed the need for any activism, this was 
explained by the marginal importance of asexuality to their life.  For example, when asked if 
she was interested in activism, Kath, currently pursuing postgraduate studies, responded: 
No, I don’t really care, because I think there are so many more important things in life and 
since sex isn’t important to me, I don’t think about the lack of it either. I think about what I 
have to read for next week, or I think about how many pages I have to draft to my supervisor 
for next month for my thesis, and I think about what types of courses I’m going to take later 
in the autumn and that’s all I have time for 
Whereas Kath’s lack of activism was driven by a personal view of asexuality’s non-salience 
in her life, Josie returns us to a comparison with other sexualities: 
I’m not out in public marching about because its seems kind of odd I guess, because with the 
homosexual community they’re going to get hurt, hurt by ignorant assholes and there’s an 
actual real danger…The assumption of heterosexuality in some ways I thinks protects 
asexuals because even though people get mad at us that we turn them down, they can 
rationalise it in their own brains as that person is just a cold heartless standoffish bitch.  
They’re not going to say that person is a pervasion against God and I need to hurt them 
physically because of it.  So I think although I would like recognition I don’t want to co-opt 
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anybody’s existing fights for protection and safety…I think the same kinds of tactics used to 
get recognition for the homosexual community, would not work with the asexual community. 
Ad campaigns might, basic sexual education in Sex Ed curriculums might…But I don’t think 
that marching in the street or being loud and proud would do much…if you see a bunch of 
asexuals marching down the street everyone’s going to go like oh, oh right and go about their 
business. Its only one on one with somebody like the guy whose trying to ask you out and is 
getting aggressive about it because you keep turning him down, that’s where the danger lies 
for any individual…it’s always at the individual level and not the social one, based on my 
experience. 
Here we see Josie draw a careful line between the activism required for homosexuality and 
for asexuality.  The threat of physical violence is seen as less stark for asexual people, with, 
as for Martha, the main threat instead coming at an interpersonal level from aggressive men 
whose advances are rejected.  This, of course, is not a threat particular to asexual people but 
instead impacts all women. What is significant here though, is that Josie sees this as 
particular to asexuality yet does not see it as grounds for wider activism; it is seen 
pragmatically as not especially helpful.  For her, the problem is framed around interpersonal 
relations which, for her, can be solved via education rather than the ‘existing fights’ which 
are required for the ‘social’ forms of inequality experienced by homosexual people.  
Therefore, we can see how what Josie terms the ‘assumption of heterosexuality’ may in fact 
mean some asexual people feel less need to confront forms of inequality which they may not 
directly experience. 
It was this desire for education that inspired many people to engage in some form of public 
activity. For example, three of our participants had agreed to media appearances.  Carla, who 
was interviewed for a local gay magazine, argued it was important to have asexuality ‘pop up 
here and there’ to encourage visibility.  In addition to this we found instances of people doing 
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activities such as: helping arrange events for asexual awareness week, having a visible 
asexuality tattoo, wearing the black ring5, sharing links to articles about asexuality, writing a 
blog post, and trying to arrange meetings with asexual people new to their area. 
However, even among this active group, there was no suggestion that their activity linked to a 
wider question of social change, as suggested in the political literature, rather the main goal 
was simply to increase awareness of asexuality. This was seen as especially important for 
young people who hopefully would not face the uncertainty our participants did growing up a 
time with a low level of asexual awareness.  This is, of course, an admirable goal. It does not, 
however, suggest any of the claims of the political literature concerning a desire to challenge 
a particular social system.    To use the language of Richardson (1990:127-9), a significant 
majority of our participants drew upon a ‘cultural’ narrative that placed themselves within the 
normative order of society, but not a ‘collective’ narrative which, by developing a 
‘consciousness of kind’ provided the possibility for social transformation.  Indeed, Lisa spoke 
specifically of her willingness to ‘let the status quo persist’, since she had no need to 
introduce someone to a gay partner.  By making inflated claims of the political potential of 
asexuality then, as Milks (2014) suggests, these acts of kindness towards others and attempts 
at increasing knowledge are devalued.  They are positioned as just indicators of a true, 
radical, asexual politics, rather than of value in and of themselves. 
 
Online Activity: AVEN and Other Spaces 
AVEN, an organisation made up of asexual people dedicated to increasing awareness, is 
significant to this paper for two reasons.  Firstly, AVEN was central to the early awareness of 
asexuality, through its website and associated forum, both of which appeared in the early 
2000s, serving as the first place for people to discover asexuality.  Furthermore, AVEN’s 
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representatives, such as David Jay, have been key political actors to date, notably by 
appearing on TV (Kim 2010). This can be praised (Hinderliter 2009) or seen as a 
manifestation of the problematic mainstreaming of the gold star asexual (Owens 2014).  
Secondly, AVEN is the most prominent space in which asexual people meet and, potentially, 
organise politically.  
We found a mix of attitudes towards, and uses of, AVEN. These partly depended on the stage 
of identification.  Positive views towards AVEN usually concerned the very early stages of 
coming to an asexual identity, as for Martha: 
When I first found AVEN it was still relatively new but there was still a pretty significant 
community from all across the world and I did one of these standard introductory posts and 
described my situation…just, you know, my name, I’m this old, I’m thinking that I’m 
asexual, I’m pretty sure I’m asexual…these are the things I’m having a problem with and it 
would be really nice to know I’m not alone. I’m glad I found you guys. And then just, hands, 
hands to grab.  
For others, it was not necessarily the presence of such a support group that was useful about 
AVEN but instead the very fact of its existence.  Eloise described reading the FAQ section on 
the site as akin to ‘a choir of angels singing’ and Catherine spoke of how it ‘made me realise 
that I was acceptable’. 
However, for many people their initial visit to AVEN was brief. Rather than engaging in 
forum discussions or reading the FAQs many participants suggested it was simply the front 
page of the site, with its definition of asexuality, which was important.  Once that language 
had been supplied the site had fulfilled its use.  Indeed, many spoke of themselves as ‘lurkers’ 
on AVEN, occasionally looking at the forum but never contributing to it.  As Sophie put it: ‘it 
was nice to know there is a community if I needed them but…I never really did’.   
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When discussing online sources AVEN was not the first choice for many of our participants.  
For example, Kath visited AVEN but since its users ‘have sub-categories of everything’ and 
‘there’s lots of information and people have all sorts of peculiar labels for themselves’ she 
was more confused about her identity having visited. The same was true for Ella, whose 
initial visit left her ‘scratching my head and going “Huh?”’.  Given this, many participants 
expressed an admiration for another site: Tumblr, whose value was seen to reside in its ability 
for personalisation.  Rather than disembodied description of what aromantic, demisexual, 
grey-a etc. meant people could read first-hand accounts of how people thought of themselves, 
and share resources more effectively through re-blogging posts and the use of videos.   
There was also a group who chose Tumblr over AVEN for strategic reasons, as was the case 
for Liam: 
I’ve had a Tumblr for a few years and found those asexual people and I kind of like them 
better because the one’s on AVEN are a little crazy sometimes…I think I’ve seen one like 
asexuals are superior genetically. So sometimes the Tumblr ones are better. The Tumblr ones 
are just like yeah, go us!...The AVEN ones are very, very elitist. 
This brings us to a wider point about the kind of political subjectivities being represented on 
AVEN.  Liam’s claim that he found AVEN users elitist, or Nate’s claim that it was ‘stuffy’ 
and ‘cliquey’, were not solitary views.  For example, both Simon and Bella criticised the 
unwillingness to consider medical explanations for asexuality which, for Bella, meant AVEN 
was an ableist space in which some users were dismissed as ‘just autistic’ and therefore not 
‘truly’ asexual.  Faith ascribed this to the dominance of ‘middle class white heterosexual’ 
users who, given AVEN’s policy of not seeking to ‘call out’ users couldn’t be challenged on 
their views.  This was linked to what Sophie saw as the desire for AVEN users to be the 
guardians of ‘genuine’ asexuality by determining who gets to ‘count’ as asexual; as Nate put, 
it, there was an attempt to create ‘a little secret society’6.   
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While some participants recognised the value of having AVEN as a space in which people 
could meet, support each, arrange meet-ups and potentially organise politically, others were 
dismissive of the need for this and/or the particular format of AVEN.  This included its 
perceived attempt to impose one ‘true’ definition of asexuality and its resulting ‘ableist’ or 
‘elitist’ nature which was seen to exclude some.  This again indicates the need to be aware of 
the diversity of asexuality and the danger of ascribing a political position to this orientation. 
As Nasela said, she would,  
have to have more in common with the people. Rather than just being asexual. Because for 
me that’s not really common ground. Because that’s like to me being friends with everyone 
who has blue eyes. Just because their eyes are blue like it doesn’t tell you anything about a 
person or what they’re going to be like. I think people tend to forget that when they sort of 
congregate in huge groups of just common identity. 
This brings us to the final element of the political literature: the role of asexuality in LGBT 
groups and politics. 
 
LGBT Groups/Politics  
The relations between our participants and LGBT groups were complex and multifaceted. 
Nasela, for example, became aware of asexuality through her membership of an LGBT 
group; prior to this she had identified as a lesbian.  She discussed the process of coming to an 
asexual identity within the group: 
I think it was just admitting it to myself. I thought that I couldn’t be just a little bit asexual. I 
thought oh I need to be asexual. And I need to be an asexual activist. And I need to fight for 
my right to be in LGBTQ. But then I thought to myself do I want to be in LGBTQ? Do I want 
to be included? And then I thought I’m just quite happy.  
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Nasela was also aware of how many LGBT groups, unlike hers, had been unwelcoming of 
asexual people: 
I remember reading a quote like ‘Asexuals really don’t need to go through that struggle. They 
just need to stay at home and do nothing’. And I thought that is kind of true. But at the same 
time you’re trying to be part of an inclusive group who have been oppressed and have been 
prejudged. But they are pre-judging other people. 
She preferred the label ‘queer’ as it was more pragmatically useful: 
I think I do value it…and I think there’s strengths and limitations…I think if someone said 
‘Well how do you identify?’ and I’ve said ‘Oh, I’m a homoromantic asexual’ they’d just be 
like ‘What?’…I think some people can use labels in their masses and then bamboozle other 
people. And I just don’t want to do that. So I say ‘Queer’. And if they say ‘Well what does 
queer mean?’ and I’ll say ‘Right, well here's what queer means’. 
Furthermore, having gained this identity, she found the actual meetings unhelpful: 
I went along to one of their coffee dates, but…I don’t like to sit around a table and talk about 
my identity and everyone else’s identity and stuff like that …It’s just people shouting at one 
another in a room…that’s what we’d spend meetings doing – just shouting at one another. It’d 
be ‘What does queer mean?’ ‘Queer means this’ ‘Queer’ and I’m trying to minute all this and 
it’s just all nonsense! 
The twists and turns of Nasela’s encounters with her LGBT group reflect many of themes 
common to our sample.  While discussion within the political literature and elsewhere has 
discussed asexuality’s place, or not, with the LGBTQIA umbrella, what can be marginalised 
is that many asexual people will be part of these groups based upon their romantic 
orientations and/or identification before coming to asexuality.  This could be, like Nasela, due 
to identification as a lesbian or, as for Karin, transgender.   
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In our sample, LGBT groups were open to asexuality. A notable exception was Faith, who 
was excluded from her high school’s LGBT group since the President was not willing to 
accept anyone outside the LGB (sic) group.  Aside from this, participants would either say, 
much as with discrimination, that they knew of others being excluded, but they had been 
‘lucky’ or, that while groups generally were welcoming, individuals within them may be less 
so.  An example of this came from Bella who, during a debate at her LGBT group on whether 
they should change their name to LGBTQ+ one member argued that ‘asexuals can get their 
own club’. However, even here, the name change went ahead and asexual people were 
explicitly welcomed. 
More generally, it is possible to identify three relationships between our participants and 
LGBT groups/politics.  For a large group, following comments offered in previous sections, 
they saw little need to associate or act with asexual people/other members under the 
umbrella.  Another group, primarily heteroromantic, expressed sympathy with such groups 
but argued that their romantic orientation meant they did not feel it was appropriate to join 
them. Finally, a third group were active in the groups.   
However, a significant question confronted our participants once they were in these groups: 
were their concerns and political interests the same as other members?  This returns us to the 
intersection of romantic and sexual identities. Those participants who identified as 
homo/bi/pan romantic tended to view their membership of LGBT groups as somewhat of an 
automatic. For example, Delphi, as a queer asexual, suggested that ‘I don’t ever have the 
luxury of my private life being seen as apolitical’ and spent some of her time trying to ‘foster 
an environment where somebody feels space to come out as queer’.  Delphi was also eager 
for asexual people becoming a visible presence at Pride.  Meanwhile Karin, who identified as 
transgender, was involved in local protests against cuts in social support and had used a 
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controversy concerning misogyny on her campus as the chance to pen a University article 
advocating respect for all, including asexual people. 
However, for participants of other romantic identities this was less clear.  The 
aforementioned comments concerning the ability of heteroromantic asexuals to ‘pass’ 
(Goffman 1963) meant most felt little need to seek out membership of an LGBT society.  A 
good example came from Simone, who openly wondered about her place in such a group: 
There’s a big debate over whether asexuality is inherently queer…Asexuals who have 
heteronormative relationships – like, are they really asexual or are they really queer or 
something? And the fact that I do have a heterosexual relationship, it’s kind of put me on the 
outside of that...that doesn’t really affect how I feel about myself but that kind of affects how 
I participate in discussions about asexuality. ‘Cause I’m always coming from the point of 
someone in a heteronormative relationship that looks completely normal…I’m never going to 
be persecuted for having this relationship. So all of my asexual experiences are on the inside; 
like the way I react to things and not the way people react to me. 
The three groups and their differing relationship to LGBT groups questions the idea that 
asexual people would be invested with a queer political perspective (Chasin 2013, Kurowicka 
2015).  Some did indeed hold queer political positions, but this was not due solely to an 
asexual position, but rather reflected the diversity of identities within asexuality.  It also, once 
more, reminds us of the need to recognise that the extent of political activism is an empirical 
question to be answered, and in which the intersecting identities of individuals plays a role, 
rather than something to be assumed based upon one element of their identity. 
 
Conclusion 
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As we have seen, the political views and engagements from asexual people differed greatly 
and, contrary to claims from the political literature, had no suggestion of any intrinsic link 
between asexuality and radical politics.  Given the diversity within asexuality this should not 
be especially surprising.  Indeed, for many of our participants, asexuality had little impact on 
their day-to-day lives, particularly in terms of generating the forms of discrimination and 
exclusion which would spur individuals towards political action.  Furthermore, 
heteroromantic asexual people claimed they could ‘pass’ quite effectively at an everyday 
level and, for others, the fact asexuality defined a ‘lack’ of something made activism 
unnecessary.  Of course, this was not a universal case and we have shown instances of people 
for whom asexuality was a central part of their identity, which led them to activism and were 
involved in LGBT politics.  In this sense, the political literature has partly captured the 
experience of one group of asexual people but has, problematically, universalised and 
radicalised it. In doing so, such scholars have overlooked to need to recognise the ‘interactive 
self, striving for meaning…in specific social worlds’ (Plummer 2001:255) 
There are two possible responses to our argument. The first one is to argue that it is not the 
political activities of asexual people which are important, but rather their very existence and 
practices.  By being asexual people have the potential to question sexusociety and its forms.  
There are two problems with this claim. Firstly, it tends to see actors as individualised in their 
actions – they simply act as ‘an asexual’ – rather than embedded in social relationships which 
shape their actions (as in intimate relationships).  By treating ‘asexuality’ as a disembodied 
identity to which we can ascribe intent we marginalise the more important question of how 
asexual people act in society. This is where starting from the critical humanist position of 
Plummer (2001), and beginning our discussion with the ways in which people negotiate and 
interact in varied social worlds, is a valuable corrective.  Secondly, it is somewhat of a 
circular argument; it proclaims both that asexual people are limited in acting as they wish due 
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to sexusociety but that by engaging in asexual practices asexual people challenge 
sexusociety.  In this sense, almost every form of existence around asexuality can be 
considered ‘resistance’.  In so doing the pragmatic adjustments of individuals to their social 
situation are overlooked in an attempt to identify a ‘vanguard’ (Duncan 2011)7.  Whatever 
their own perspectives and actions, individuals are made into radicals. 
The second response leads on from this.  It could be said that whatever the views and 
experiences of our participants, once we take a step back and consider the matter we can 
recognise that a radical politics which hopes to transcend sexusociety is the best, and perhaps 
only, way in which asexuality can achieve social acceptance.  In this view, asexual people 
who do not currently hold this political position need to be persuaded of its value.  To return 
to the work of Richardson (1990), the ‘cultural’ narratives of participants need to become 
‘collective’, and thereby transformative, ones.  This may, or may not, be true and is beyond 
the scope of this article.  However, it does highlight the need for sociologists to separate out 
two separate arguments.  Namely, it is one thing to argue for particular political position one 
values and sees as important, but it is an entirely different thing to argue these are the views 
groups should/do hold.  The latter requires the varied voices, and social positions, of this 
group to be heard. 
Notes 
1. We have elsewhere (Scott, McDonnell, Dawson 2016; Dawson, Scott, McDonnell 2017) 
discussed some of these issues in more depth in relation to the plurality and complexity of 
asexual identities and practices. Therefore, we will not repeat those arguments in total here 
but rather discuss how these issues reflect on the possible political outcomes associated with 
asexuality. 
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2. As highlighted, Gupta shares an argument found more generally in the political literature 
concerning the transformation of intimate relationships.  We have discussed this argument, 
and its limitations, in Dawson, McDonnell, Scott (2016). 
3. Ethnicity was a self-completion category for our project.  This number is the sum of those 
who provided some category of ‘whiteness’ (e.g. white, white British, white European etc.) 
and ‘Caucasian’.  8 participants chose to provide their nationality here or did not wish to 
provide an answer.  None of our participants provided a category of ‘blackness’.  As a result 
of all this it is difficult to declare definitively what ethnic groups were, or were not, included 
in our data beyond the recognition it was a significantly ‘white’ group 
4. We should also recognise the forms of discrimination people experience may not be related to 
their sexual orientation as just one aspect of their identity.  This can occur on the basis on 
disability (Bella) or age (Ella).   
5. This is a ring with a black stone, which identifies the wearer as asexual. 
6. Some other participants, while sharing these concerns, saw them as generic problems with 
internet forums, rather than with AVEN specifically. 
7. It is, of course, possible that being part of a revolutionary vanguard might be the ‘pragmatic’ 
choice in a situation where only radical social change is seen as possible to the individual 
concerned. However, this was not the case in our sample. 
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